Habit and Mind. On the Teleology of Mental Habits by Zhok, Andrea
abstract
keywords
Teleology of habit, meaning, motivation, husserl, Peirce, Wittgestein
andrea ZhoK 
università degli Studi di milano 
andrea.zhok@unimi.it
in the following pages we shall discuss the notion of habit in sight of its role in the 
constitution of meaning. We make use of Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule following to 
show the crucial role played by habits in the establishment of verbal meanings. Then, 
we show how habits can be established according to the Peircian model of abduction. 
The generalizing power of abduction (and habit) is explained in terms of teleological 
motivation, whose roots we expose by means of husserl’s analyses on passive synthesis. 
finally, we draw the conclusion that the notion of habit may lead to a “non-naturalistic 
naturalization” of mind, that is, a “naturalization” opposed to both objectivistic and 
reductionist accounts of mind.
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The notion of “habit” is a philosophically crucial and often misunderstood 
notion. Usually “habits” are mentioned in two theoretical contexts: 
by mentioning (and often stigmatizing) the power of mere reiteration 
of experiences in the constitution of beliefs, and by questioning the 
transmission of social practices.
The first case is emblematically represented by Hume’s treatment of habits, 
which considers them a powerful force in the mind, while simultaneously 
depicting them as mere mechanisms, enforced by the contingent regularity 
of nature. This way of understanding habits grants them a central position, 
but at the same time makes of habits something essentially meaningless: an 
unanalyzable contingent fact of nature.
The second interpretation regards the notion of habit as akin to “custom” 
and makes use of it as an explanatory key for traditions and social practices. 
This acceptation is legitimate and interesting, however it disregards the 
essential discontinuity between habits and social practices. habits are 
personal: they may or may not have been inherited from social transmission, 
and they may or may not be intersubjectively shareable. Therefore habits 
are only a necessary precondition for social practices, but in order to become 
social practices a mechanism of transmission must be implemented, and 
this raises further questions that go beyond the nature of habit.
in the following pages we want to discuss the notion of habit in the light 
of its crucial role in the constitution of meaning. as we are going to show 
“habit” is the essential key to grasp and interpret the whole sphere of 
“learned contents” as such.
wittgenstein’s argument on the conditions for following a rule is among 
the most discussed pieces of philosophical literature, however its scope is 
not always clearly perceived. By focussing on rules wittgenstein actually 
examines the conditions for learning and standardizing any mental content 
that we may use with constancy over time. This means that what counts 
for rules does count for any learned meaning, inclusive of the most strict and 
formal ones, like the ones handled by mathematical thought.
wittgenstein noticed that, although ordinary language follows rules, we 
usually do not know either which rules we are using, or how to explain 
them. Furthermore, any explanation of the meaning of a sentence is 
finite and can never be exhaustive: if I do not understand “snow is white”, 
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somebody can try to explain each word occurring in the sentence, and at 
some point, if the explanation is still unsuccessful, the verbal dimension 
will be trespassed by coming to a level where i will be just prompted to have 
in the first person some experiences.
By resuming wittgenstein’s point, let us suppose that we are trying to teach 
a child to count by one (positive natural numbers). all that we ordinarily do 
(and can do) is: to provide the child with examples, to require her to produce 
samples of enumeration in her turn, and to correct her possible mistakes. 
at a certain point, the child seems to be consistently successful in her 
production, and the teacher concludes that the pupil has learned to count. 
however, after some days, we could imagine that the child is required 
for the first time to count beyond 200; surprisingly, she goes on uttering 
“202”, “204”, etc. Should we object that we did not teach her to do so, she 
might flawlessly reply that we never explicitly showed her that passage, 
and that she simply understood that this was the right way to proceed. in 
principle, this misunderstanding could be repeated endlessly, since we could 
never provide the pupil with an exhaustive exemplification of all possible 
applications of the rule. Indeed, each rule (each meaning) can have infinite 
instantiations, while examples and corrections can only be finite.
however, de facto we are often successful in teaching rules; therefore, 
there must be some reason why the possible derailment of the rule does not 
usually take place. in outline wittgenstein’s answer is that when you learn 
a rule, you do not produce an interpretation of what the teacher provides you 
with (examples and corrections) (wittgenstein 1958, § 201), but you simply 
reproduce the same act that you have been initially prompted to perform. 
This means that we follow the rule “blindly”, that is, we do not warrant the 
identity of the rule by a preliminary rational act: to follow the rule is not 
to choose among alternatives (wittgenstein 1958, § 219), nor to produce 
interpretive hypotheses, but primarily to persist in performing the same 
act.
But when we talk of the “same act”, we are already mentioning a kind 
of identity, though not a rationally ascertained one. where does this 
“sameness” come from, then? The sameness of the act, says wittgenstein, 
depends primarily on its habitual nature: rules are not something that 
we could follow only once in our life - says wittgenstein - they are habits 
(customs, institutions) (wittgenstein 1958, § 199). rule learning is possible 
insofar as rules are rooted in unreflective habits.
it is important to see that the identity of any rule is never ultimate and 
definitive: the paradoxical deviation in the ordinary rule of enumeration is 
in fact a simplified version of re-interpretations that actually do take place 
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over time. For instance, in the history of mathematics there was no pre-
settled determination about how to deal with the rule of subtraction when 
the minuend is greater than the subtrahend. when the question was posed, 
the rule of subtraction had to introduce an interpretative supplement, 
which turned out to be the introduction of negative numbers. in any case, 
each interpretive act must intervene on an operational core, learned by 
examples and corrections, which is what we call habit. Therefore habits (of 
some kind) are at the roots of all meanings (concepts, notions). habits are 
anything that can be learned in experience and replicated. habits must 
not be conceived of as overt physical movements: the interiorized verbal 
sequence of a nursery rhyme or the sensorimotor sequence of saccades in 
scanning a picture can be both habits. habits lie at the heart of meanings, 
where they enable the reiterated application of the same content to infinite 
experiences. This means that habits appear at the crucial crossroad where 
the empirical and the general (universal) meet.
habit, we are claiming, is what can turn the particularity of experience into 
the generality of meaning. This, to be clear, does not mean that meaning can 
be reduced to habit: the only point that is at stake here is the passage from 
particular experiences to the generality that is essential part of meaning. 
even with this limitation, this is a fairly bold claim, since the question of 
the passage from particular experiences, especially sensuous experiences, 
to the sphere of universals is among the most debated and controversial 
issues of the history of philosophy. in any case, we shall not try to provide 
a full-fledged answer to the question of the birth of meaning, but shall 
concentrate on the emergence of its replicable “content”, leaving aside 
the crucial point of the role played by language in shaping and conveying 
meaning.
The first thing to remark is that habits need no iteration of experience in 
order to be primarily established. although the traditional psychological 
interpretation of habit considers them to be borne by repetition, this is, 
strictly speaking, impossible. clearly repetition can take place as such only 
if the first experience already has a re-identifiable content, otherwise the very 
possibility of novel instantiations of the same could not be conceivable. This 
has nothing to do with the possible awareness of the relevant identity: even if 
we are completely unaware of the identity of an emerging content through 
experience, the enforcing role of repetition can take place only when an 
identity is already available. This means that each single experience must be 
already able to institute a habit, although repetition does affect the readiness 
and smoothness in performing the acts that characterize the relevant habit. 
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This point was acknowledged also by charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce, like 
wittgenstein, recognized that habits must lie at the core of meanings; this is 
what his famous pragmatic maxim conveys:
“consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings 
you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception 
of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.” (Peirce, cP 
5.422)
The pragmatic maxim gives expression to the observation that what we 
grasp in any propositional content is a knot of the implications that we 
would be disposed to draw from a belief in that content. Such implications 
are “practical” in the undemanding sense that they are “things to do” at 
some level (including the mere deployment of further signs). The relevant 
implications can be revived by us because they are habits. The propositional 
content “snow is white” entails in principle all the verbal explanations and 
the bodily acts that we are able to produce by grasping parts and whole 
of the judgment (inclusive of perceptual acts). de facto, according to the 
context of use only a subset of those implications will be drawn.
But, how can we understand the essential passage from experience to 
general content? Peirce shows a way to deal with this question through 
his notion of abduction. Abduction is the first step in the establishment of 
the meanings (rules) to be used in reasoning and deductions. according to 
Peirce all meanings (i.e., “conceptions”), which are endowed with universal 
content, are established through experience. But inductive experience is 
not the first step in the constitution of meanings. Events can be inductively 
confirmed, and frequencies of those events can be attributed, only insofar 
as a first experience generates something like a hypothesis (Peirce, cP 6.144-
6.145). This movement that generates hypotheses from primal experience is 
what he calls abduction: “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory 
hypotheses. it is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” 
(cP 5.172). abduction comprises “all the operations by which theories and 
conceptions are engendered” (cP 5.590).
In fact, how exactly abduction is to be understood is not thoroughly clarified 
in Peirce’s texts, its crucial role notwithstanding. abduction is not primarily 
the conscious formulation of a hypothesis, but is the origin of the contents 
with which conscious hypotheses can be built. when an experience is 
apprehended, it turns itself immediately into an expectation referring 
to a class of possible events: by making the acquaintance of an individual 
(say, “Kant”), i can immediately grasp a class of items kin of it (anything 
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“Kantian”). any experience (sensuous experience to begin with) immediately 
brings to light an instance which is capable of being re-instantiated; this 
instance already is a habit since it is a relatively stable disposition concerning 
what we can do. and, as we said, the relevant habit need not have any overt 
muscular-bodily manifestation: if a word steadily elicits a series of other 
words in my mind (as in a poem known by heart), this practical effect may not 
have any manifest behavioral expression, but it still is a habit.
We can try to improve our understanding of the first establishment of habit 
by looking at husserl’s analyses of the temporalization of experiences and of 
its connection with the idea of motivated possibilities. in husserlian language 
the passage from sensuous impressions to established meanings (noemata) 
may be articulated as follows.
Primal impressions (ur-impressionen), which are the most elementary level 
of sensuous experience, affect consciousness and produces a modification 
(Modifikation) of consciousness. This process of modification primarily 
appears as temporalization. Temporalization takes place in the form of an 
internal (essential) relation between so-called retentions and protentions.
retentions are the passive moment of sensuous consciousness, which 
apprehends our experiences as a train of events ordered by succession 
(hua X: 118): if we hear a melody, the tenth tone receives its musical 
meaning from the previous nine tones, inclusive of the specific duration 
of (possible) silent intervals; the antecedent tones (and intervals) bestow 
meaning to the present impression without being present and without 
being voluntarily presentified (recollected). Thus retentions originarily 
posit an order of succession. in fact, retentions must not be reduced to 
any psychophysiological model of memory, where succession would be 
supposedly generated out of a merely present state of affairs (mnestic 
trace, memory storage). indeed, you cannot describe any process where a 
succession would be “generated” without already implying that succession 
is entertained by a mind (consciousness). if one thinks that a present entity, 
for instance a magnetic track, can somehow “stand for” a succession, one 
should realize that this track has an order of succession only if it is “read” 
by somebody, who “keeps track” of the gradually receding elements of 
the track, in their specific order and “timing”. Otherwise you just have a 
piece of present matter without any reference to any temporal ordering. 
This means that you cannot “generate” succession without resorting to the 
kind of primal ordering activity that we recognize in living consciousness.1 
1  For a more detailed discussion of temporalization in phenomenology, we take the liberty to 
refer the reader to Zhok 2012: 216-225 and Zhok 2011: 247-251.
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Retentions are not, and cannot be, “facts”; they are modifications of 
consciousness that can be retrospectively discovered from their present 
offshoots.
retentions constitutively issue into protentions, whose motivated character is 
qualified by the retentional content (Hua XI: 337). Protentions are tacit plural 
expectations, based on retentional content. Protentions are not specific conscious 
expectations for two reasons: 1) because they do not imply any pre-figuration and 
2) because they are not bound to a single content. For instance, when i walk i 
may have no pre-figuration whatsoever, but if the ground collapses under my 
feet, my surprise and disappointment show that my walking body did have 
a tacit expectation concerning the solidity of the ground. and secondly, this 
expectation is only one in an indefinite plurality of similar tacit expectations. 
For instance, if during my unfortunate walk oxygen suddenly disappeared, i 
would learn the hard way that among my tacit expectations there was also the 
smoothness of breathing; and so on.
The essential point to grasp in this scheme is that retentions, being 
modifications of consciousness, are not sensuous particulars anymore: 
primal impressions can be said to be particulars, but retentions, which are 
prompted by primal impressions, already have a general content insofar as 
their “content” motivates protentions. motivation (“teleological impulse”) is the 
crucial generalizing power in consciousness. 
This passage could be also described as follows: sensuous experiences are 
particulars that primarily elicit “passive reactions” (retentional content), 
which are part of our general bodily sensorimotor reactivity; such reactions 
institute habits, since they can be re-activated in different moments as 
bearers of the same sense (function, télos). each time a sensuous impression 
is apprehended as percept, it implicitly dictates a range of motivated 
expectations (protentions) concerning its possible developments (husserl’s 
adumbrations, abschattungen). This horizon of embodied expectations is 
precisely the initial phase of what we are calling “habit”.
indeed, husserl himself describes habit (habitualität) in internal connection 
with the notion of Vermöglichkeit, which is a learned disposition that opens up 
a room of possibilities (hua XXXiii: 24-5; huamat Viii: 378-381). what Peirce 
conceives as abduction (primordial hypothesis) is described by husserl 
through the passage from sensuous affections to embodied dispositions 
(habits as Vermöglichkeiten). Such embodied dispositions initially appear 
as protentions, which primarily are perceptual expectations, rooted 
in sensorimotor (kinesthetic) activity. They are indeed something like 
“perceptual hypotheses”, that can be confirmed, corrected and replicated 
over time. Since perception is the first source of all learned meanings, this 
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scheme accounts for the basic establishment of those habits that provide the 
core content of meanings.
yet, the classical idea of habit, as it appears in humean accounts, seems 
rather at odds with our ordinary notion of meaning. Meanings are flexible, 
intelligible and, of course, “significant”, whereas habits are often conceived 
as dumb mechanisms. it is therefore important to carefully re-consider the 
nature of habits. In order to do so, the first thing that we have to do is to 
re-consider the nature of perceptual habits, that is, of the habits that are on 
display in our customary sensuous behavior.
let us take a trivial example of learned sensuous behavior: i am in the 
street and jump on my motorcycle; while beginning to move from the right 
sidewalk i see just in front of my tire a broken bottle; immediately i look to 
the left, to see if anybody is coming, before turning in order to avoid the 
bottle. now, this is a trivial case of behavior, guided by perception, where no 
reflective act has taken place. what is interesting to note is that this behavior 
has a clear logical structure, which can be easily translated into a structured 
reasoning. it is precisely as if i had said to myself: “i want to go, but if i go in 
this direction, i may damage my tire, then i shall change my trajectory, yet 
if i suddenly turn left, somebody could run into my vehicle, therefore i check 
that nobody is there.” This is a sample of what constantly happens in our 
usual sensuous behavior: in the wake of what we have practically learned, 
we perform tacit hypothetical reasonings and conditional inferences, 
using as occasional material for the inferences the current perceptual and 
behavioral contents. our practical competence (in riding the motorcycle, 
moving around in the street, detecting obstacles, etc.) has been acquired 
through experience and is available in the form of habits. But, contrary to 
what is often thought, the fact that habits can work “mindlessly”, does not 
imply at all that habits are “dumb mechanisms”.
First of all, habits are not mechanisms: they are sensitive to the 
environment and they keep their sense even when they have to take 
into account obstacles and delays. any habitual behavior is sensitive to 
current environmental changes and is altogether different from a kind of 
ballistic device, which, after being launched, would proceed unchanged 
till completion. Take some dull habit like walking or cleaning the floor 
with a broom. even if we have never truly envisaged the “ends” or 
“functions” involved in the current implementation of such habits, they 
unfold by appropriately reacting to different and changing contexts: we 
can meet irregularity in the ground or obstacles on the floor and we can 
(unreflectively) update our habitual behavior. In comparison with reflective 
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behavior, habitual behavior may appear “blind” because it is not concerned 
with foresight, and it may appear “mechanical” because it does not need 
reflective awareness. indeed, habits may be judged to be “short-sighted”, but 
in the short radius of the anticipations of perception (protentions) they are 
quite sensitive and far from blind.
Secondly, habits are not “dumb”: they have a teleological structure which can 
be made more and more complex and subtle. habits can be borne from the 
simplest sensorimotor reactions, but their “heuristic” and “explorative” 
character, which we saw as abduction, remains operative and generates 
continuous “ramifications”. Think of a learned skill like playing tennis. You 
begin by learning simple motor schemes in standardized situations, but 
through practice (which is no mere “repetition”), you acquire the ability to 
quickly adjust the performance to new situations and for different postures. 
when somebody knows how to play tennis, she has learned a complex habit 
that is unified by its teleological character (the aims of the game) and 
which involves a plurality of “knots”, from which contextually appropriate 
behavior flows. Habits, thus, far from being mechanisms, are living 
practices, where at each stage (“knot”) a plurality of alternative options are 
available. each “choice” at each “knot” has a logical form, without any logos 
(language) being involved. when playing we are continuously in situations 
which could be described by sequences of hypothetical and conditional 
inferences: “if the opponent does so, i should go there and prepare this stroke, 
but, look, she does so and so, then…, etc.” all this inferential process need 
no reflective act to be intelligently developed (and, in fact, if reflection 
intervenes, the behavioral outcome  often turns out to be suboptimal). 
habits are functional, teleological and plastic. The plasticity of habit is 
permitted, among other things, precisely by its teleological orientation, 
which makes possible that a plurality of courses be legitimate insofar as 
they converge in the same issue (or perform the same function).
The central position that we have here attributed to the notion of habit 
seems to move in the direction of a naturalization of meaning and mind. 
yet, this excludes the mainstream sense of “naturalization”. in the 
present account, consistent with wittgensteinian and Peircian analyzes, 
habits appear as the embodied basis of meaning. habits perform a sort of 
mediatory role between the particularity of sensuous experience and the 
generality of expectations, hypotheses and concepts. yet, we should be wary 
not to conceive of habits as “physiological dispositions”. The present account 
of the function of habit cannot be translated into any usual naturalistic 
description, because naturalism assumes an ontological priority of the 
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objects described by natural sciences, to which all other descriptions should 
be reduced. But the conceptual scope of the objectivistic categories of 
natural sciences is too limited to account for either “meaning” or “habit”.
More specifically, in the light of what we said above, the notion of “habit” 
turns out to be unintelligible without reference to “temporalization” and 
“teleology”, but neither notion can be translated into naturalistic terms. 
That is, neither “temporalization”, nor “teleology” can be expressed through 
objectivistic notions, i.e., through notions that regard as ontologically 
real only what is describable as spatiotemporal object. The essence of the 
customary idea of a naturalization of mind is the descriptive or causal 
reduction of first person phenomena to third person accounts in terms of 
spatiotemporal objects (events). This is no sensible option for the notion of 
habit because neither finality nor temporality (nor living corporeity, for 
that matter) can be reduced to accounts in terms of mere objects (events) in 
space and time.
habits primarily emerge from perceptual meaningful activity, not from causal 
chains of physical events, even if we can partially describe perceptual 
activity in terms of physical causes. The reiterability of habits, which is what 
makes them eligible for becoming part of shared meanings, depends on their 
teleological sense, which can be regarded as a “natural phenomenon” but 
most certainly is no “naturalistic fact”.
The generality of habits must be recognized at two levels. at the personal 
level, i can reactivate over time the same habit elicited by different sensuous 
particulars. at the interpersonal level, we can learn the same habit by 
different routes. For instance, me and you can both learn to ride a bike, and 
thus we can both access the knot of implications (meanings) included in 
“riding a bike” (traveling, training, sweating, but also the hardness of 
saddle, the danger of wet tracks, the muscular cramps, the wind in the 
eyes, the flat tires, etc.). All such blocks of practices inherent in the iterable 
notion “riding a bike” can be learned even if the specific biographical 
circumstances where we have learned to ride the bike are remarkably 
different. i may have fallen while learning and you may not, i may have 
learned by myself, and you under somebody’s guidance, etc. nevertheless, 
the identity of the practice can be preserved over time, and often shared. 
what precisely can or cannot be shared is discovered only after establishing 
a stable communication on such items, but the essential point here is that a 
stable operational core there is, and this is what allows the communication 
of meanings.
yet, the fact that habits are to some extent independent from sensuous 
particulars does not mean that they are extraneous either to bodily 
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constitution or to the exposure to specific kinds of experiences.
as to bodily constitution, habits are learned continuously and 
spontaneously whenever appropriately demanding conditions occur. even 
if there are in principle endless ways to perform an action developing 
from a to B, there is always for each bodily constitution an ideal “line of 
less resistance”, which is not represented by a physically unique course, 
but by a family of closely connected acts. when we walk, each step of ours 
has certainly some idiosyncratic particularity, but its typical unreflective 
identity is guaranteed by the fact that, under the same external conditions, 
there is a spontaneous way to unfold muscular contractions and balancing 
acts, so as to make the step most smooth and functional (“natural”). This 
line of less resistance is what leads to the establishment of a specific habit 
instead of another. if we want to alter the spontaneous development of an 
unfolding habit of ours, we must expose our behavior to special constraints, 
that lead to spontaneously learning a different habit. This is what happens 
in special trainings (sports), but is not different in principle from what 
happens, for instance, when we adjust our gate to a pain in the leg, by 
limping: in the presence of pain, the new limping gate is a new line of less 
resistance in our walking habit; and, after being learned, the limp can be 
freely simulated. The felt line of less resistance is generally sufficient to 
establish habits as monotonous and roughly self-identical.
Thus, our ability to establish some habits and not others is inescapably 
rooted in our bodily constitution; from this perspective, we can make sense 
of the famous wittgensteinian remark according to which “[i]f a lion could 
talk, we could not understand it” (wittgenstein 1958: 225). if, by hypothesis, 
the bodily constitution of a lion and its habits are taken to be radically 
different from ours, no shareable core of experiences available for verbal 
signification could be found.
But also the specific exposure to some classes of experiences is decisive in 
learning determinate habits. as michael Polanyi said, in order to become 
a good medical diagnostician (or a connoisseur of wines as well), a subject 
must be exposed to a plurality of appropriate experiential samples, under 
the guidance of experts that already possess the relevant discriminating 
abilities and that signal the aspects to which attention must be especially 
devoted (Polanyi 1969: 54). Polanyi recalls the learning process that 
gradually enabled him to read pulmonary radiographs: at the beginning, 
he says, the image looked to him like a blurred jumble, where he could 
hardly discern heart and ribs, while the radiologist’s comments sounded 
to him like a kind of bluff, a stageplay pretending to take those muddled 
blots as a precious informative source. only after a repeated commented 
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vision of those images, weeks later, he began to make out a rich landscape of 
meaningful signs, signaling physiological variations, pathological changes, 
scars, infections, etc. (Polanyi 1969: 100-101). The increased perceptual 
ability was, of course, no matter of improved visual acuity, but of learning a 
habitual articulation of units and differences, emerging as a system of signs. 
incidentally Polanyi notices that although he dropped the medical career 
and the relevant studies, this ability to read radiographs never went lost.
if we take both sides of the relation that can generate habits, we can see 
in which sense we can, and in which we cannot, talk of a “naturalization” 
of habit (and mind). habits are neither physical facts nor reducible to 
physical facts. yet habits are inescapably bound to bodily constitution and 
to appropriate experiential exposure. in this sense, instead of talking of 
“naturalization” we may prefer to talk of an “ecological correlation” where 
bodily constitution and the available environment concur in articulating a 
world of “practical units”. we can apprehend, remember, re-instantiate and 
mean what we usually do, insofar as we have the bodily constitution we have 
and as we are exposed to a specific environment.
This does not imply, notice, that different body constitutions or different 
environments would necessarily dictate radically different habits (and 
meanings). This may or may not be the case. i may suppose that things look 
mysteriously different to the proverbial nagelian bat, or that they look just 
more limited than how they look to us, or even that they do not “look” at all 
to the bat. what we can know, and what we can guess, anyway makes just use 
of the set of habits that we can recognize in the first person and of their variations.
 There are chromatic phenomena to me, because i have eyes. does it mean 
that a gradual change of my eyes, becoming something radically different, 
would involve a gradual change in the sensuous phenomena at my disposal? 
altogether different colours? altogether different sensations? This 
development is quite unwarranted and our usual experience bears witness 
to a different development: when reaching certain phenomenal thresholds 
experiences simply lose their unity and intelligibility.
in other terms, the contents of my world may well be tightly dependent 
on my body and its habits, yet this does not exclude the subsistence of 
essential boundaries within which experiential units can only emerge. The 
kind of “ecological naturalization” that this perspective allows invites to 
reflect on the living correlation of our body and its environment (which 
may be historical and cultural). it is our living and operative position in the 
natural and historical environment that determines the space of habits and 
therefore the palette with which the world of meanings can be painted.
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